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I. INTRODUCTION
The growing concern for environmental quality in this country
reflects a fundamental change in the common perception of the
natural environment. Initially, the abundance of the American wil-
derness combined with a commitment to rapid economic growth to
form an environmental attitude one author has called the
"Assumption of Inexhaustible Resources."' Environmental waste
and pollution were considered irrelevant when balanced against a
genuine need for economic development and a desire for short-term
profits.2 Nature was to be overcome, not preserved. The commerce
of the United States, much of it with an interstate character, devel-
1. Laitos, A Leap of Faith: Some Observations on Law's Effect Upon the Earth's Natu-
ral Resources, 25 Am. U. L. REV. 131, 132 (1975).
2. See id. at 132-35, 133 n.7; Tarlock, A Comment on Meyer's Introduction To Environ-
mental Thought, 50 IND. L.J. 454, 456 (1975).
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oped under these precepts of resource exploitation and the Inex-
haustible Assumption. This commerce was protected by the nega-
tive commerce clause3 which served to void state protectionist legis-
lation that would have created an economic "Balkanization"I detri-
mental to national economic growth.
The cumulative effects of environmental change have spawned
a new perception of the environment as a finite, exhaustible entity
requiring protection. States have responded with environmental
protection legislation, which inevitably conflicts with the commerce
of resource exploitation developed under the Assumption of Inex-
haustible Resources. Enterprises operating in interstate commerce
have challenged such legislation under the negative commerce
clause, which has traditionally defended resource exploitation com-
merce against state protectionism.
Judicial negative commerce clause analysis is both confused
and confusing, particularly when applied to state environmental
legislation. As a threshold requirement, the Supreme Court prohib-
its all state legislation that discriminates against interstate com-
merce.5 The definition of discrimination, however, is unclear. While
precedent exists that arguably supports uneven treatment of inter-
state commerce on environmental grounds,' the Court in the recent
case City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey' held such a statute discrim-
inatory. This Note posits the theory that in certain cases interstate
commerce actually discriminates against the state, thus justifying
protectionist legislation.
If a statute is deemed nondiscriminatory, the Court then differ-
entiates between taxation and regulatory statutes. In evaluating
regulatory statutes, the Court attempts to determine whether a stat-
ute's benefits to the state outweigh its burdens on interstate com-
merce. The nature of this balancing process, the factors to be con-
sidered, and the degree to which benefits must outweigh burdens
have been stated in so many contrasting ways by the Supreme Court
that a precise articulation of the test is impossible. Generally, the
Court considers legitimacy of the local purpose of a statute, whether
the means adopted achieve that purpose, and whether alternate
means would impose less burden on interstate commerce. In addi-
tion, the Court weighs the statute's benefits and burdens under a
3. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The term "negative commerce clause" refers to judicial
scrutiny of state action under the commerce clause in the absence of congressional action.
4. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807-08 (1975).
5. See notes 14-69 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 18-44 infra and accompanying text.
7. 98 S.Ct. 2531 (1978).
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heavy presumption of the statute's validity.' Yet in some instances
the Court has determined that the balancing component of the anal-
ysis is unnecessary when the statute protects health and safety.'
Still other cases have emphasized a statute's effect on the required
uniformity of state regulations affecting interstate commerce. 0
When these contrasting and conflicting standards are applied to
state environmental legislation, the result has been a confusing
combination and misapplication of the various standards."
In contrast, negative commerce clause analysis of state tax leg-
islation is relatively straightforward. Current analysis requires a
state to show the absence of discrimination against interstate com-
merce, a sufficient connection between the state and the taxed ac-
tivity, a fair apportionment of the tax, and a fair relation to the
benefits provided the taxpayer.12 A balancing of benefits and bur-
dens is avoided because a state is entitled to impose a proportionate
share of its costs on interstate commerce. The only relevant issue is
whether the dollar amount of the tax is justifiable in relation to state
costs.
This Note advocates judicial application of this tax analysis not
only to tax environmental legislation, but also to regulatory environ-
mental legislation. The theoretical justification for this thesis is
provided by the economic concept of externalities. 3 Externalities
are elements used in the production of a marketed item without cost
to the producer, but at a cost to others. The term "externality"
stems from the fact that the use of the element of production is not
included in the market price of the item. Undesirable environmen-
tal impact has been recognized as an externality-a cost to those
people adversely affected by it that is not reflected by the market
price of the item. State legislation can respond to the externality of
environmental impact in one of two ways: taxing the impact or
prohibiting it. A tax directly internalizes the externality by raising
the cost of bringing an item to market. This Note advances the
theory that a prohibition accomplishes the same result of internaliz-
8. This test was recently expressed in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
9. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Eng'rs v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. R. R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
10. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
11. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 978 (1975); American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691 (Ct.
App. 1973). These two cases, which are the principal decisions examining regulatory state
environmental legislation and the negative commerce clause, will be discussed below. See
notes 94-122 infra and accompanying text.
12. This standard was cited approvingly in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274 (1977).
13. See notes 141-75 infra and accompanying text.
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ing the externality of environmental impact; instead of adding the
cost to the item as a tax, a prohibition forces a producer to alter
internal methods of production to eliminate the impact. Both meth-
ods include the cost of the externality in the item's ultimate market
price. The actual impacts of a prohibition and a tax do suggest some
differing treatment. The difference, however, is one of degree rather
than of inherent characteristics. Application of the tax analysis to
both tax and regulatory state environmental legislation would re-
flect this fundamental similarity and avoid the inconsistency and
confusion resulting from negative commerce clause analysis of regu-
latory legislation.
II. NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
Negative commerce clause analysis of regulatory legislation
requires a two-step process. The first step is a threshold determina-
tion that the statute does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce. If the statute is deemed nondiscriminatory, the Court em-
ploys some form of balancing process to weigh the statute's benefits
to the state against its burdens on interstate commerce. Both steps
of this process have resulted in confusion when applied to state
environmental legislation.
A. Discrimination
The most rigid requirement in negative commerce clause analy-
sis is the prohibition against any form of state discrimination
against interstate commerce." Supreme Court opinions indicate
that state legislation is invalid not only when its purpose is discrimi-
natory, but also when it has an effect that discriminates against
interstate commerce.'" This focus on discriminatory effect evidences
a judicial awareness that facial evenhandedness can mask deliber-
ate or unintentional discrimination, while facial discrimination it-
self is generally the result of artless drafting.
The fact that the Court evaluates a statute's effect in addition
to its purpose and facial structure demonstrates that the label
14. Some cases, however, indicate that a finding of discrimination will not of itself
invalidate a state statute. The Court in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333 (1977), stated that "[w]hen discrimination against commerce of the type we have
found is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local
benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives
adequate to preserve the local interests at stake." Id. at 353. See also Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
15. See e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977);
Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
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"discrimination" is a judicial conclusion, and not an objective, dis-
cernible fact.'6 The Supreme Court routinely has reached the con-
clusion that state legislation is discriminatory if it creates economic
advantages for the protectionist state. When a state enacts uneven
legislation for the perceived purpose of avoiding a detrimental
burden created by interstate commerce, however, two different lines
of Supreme Court analysis have indicated that this type of uneven
legislation is not discriminatory.17 These lines of analysis are partic-
ularly relevant in determining whether state environmental legisla-
tion should be labeled "discriminatory."
(1) Articles Not Legitimately in Interstate Commerce
In a number of relatively older cases, the Court held that com-
merce clause concerns did not require invalidation of state regula-
tion of interstate transport of impure or diseased foods.' 8 These cases
apparently conclude that certain articles are beyond the scope of
legitimate commerce, and thus outside any protection afforded by
the commerce clause. Therefore they are considered wholly within
the scope of legitimate state regulation. These cases fall into two
basic categories.
The first group of cases permit the unequal treatment of com-
merce that is valueless and a health hazard. In Clason v. Indiana"
the Supreme Court upheld a ban on the out-of-state disposal of
large dead animals assumed to have no commercial value.20 In
Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.2 1 the Court approved a
similar importation prohibition. 2 2 This conclusion that interstate
commerce in valueless health hazards may be unequally treated is
supported by Texas v. Pankey,2 a recent Tenth Circuit decision in
which the state of Texas sued to enjoin New Mexico ranchers from
16. A similar view is expressed in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-5, at 327
n.7 (1978).
17. See notes 18-48 infra and accompanying text.
18. Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 444 (1939) (statute barring out-of-state disposal of
large dead animals had no discriminatory intent and was not an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935) (regulation of
milk distinguished from regulation of items "not proper subjects of commerce"); Sligh v.
Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1915) (inedible, immature citrus fruits); Crossman v. Lurman,
192 U.S. 189, 196 (1904) (deceptively adulterated coffee beans); Plumley v. Massachusetts,
155 U.S. 461, 472 (1894) (deceptively colored margarine would defraud buyers intending to
purchase butter); Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888) (state permitted
to regulate articles potentially spreading disease).
19. 306 U.S. 439 (1939).
20. Id. at 444.
21. 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
22. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
23. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971); see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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using a pesticide that polluted Texas drinking water. Although not
a commerce clause decision, Texas v. Pankey suggests a state right
under federal common law to be free from extraterritorial pollution
(a valueless health hazard) regardless of unequal treatment of inter-
state commerce. 24 In contrast is the older case Missouri v. Illinois,25
in which the Supreme Court held that in-state polluting activities
set the performance standard for out-of-state polluters. While inter-
state commerce was not at issue, Missouri v. Illinois suggests that
discriminatory treatment of out-of-state undesirable materials
would be invalid.28
The second group of cases permitting uneven treatment of arti-
cles not legitimately in interstate commerce focuses on articles that
are inherently fraudulent to the public. The Supreme Court has
upheld prohibitons barring interstate trade in butter-colored mar-
garine in Plumley v. Massachusetts,27 adulterated coffee beans in
Crossman v. Lurman,28 and inedible citrus fruits in Sligh v.
Kirkwood 2 because they were inherently deceptive items that would
defraud the public. This quality of inherent fraud was held to place
the articles under full state regulatory control without commerce
clause protection because they were not "legitimate commerce.""o
Similarly, in Morgan's S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health3' the
Court validated a charge on interstate and foreign shipping levied
to defray the costs of quarantine inspection to protect health in New
Orleans. The Court suggested that health concerns not only sup-
ported quarantine inspection charges on interstate and foreign com-
merce, but also would validate appropriate confiscatory and quar-
antine treatment of out-of-state shipping if health hazards were
discovered. 32 The statute in Morgan's S.S. Co. was aimed specifi-
cally at out-of-state health hazards; the Court did not indicate
whether comparable restrictions were imposed on intra-state ship-
ping to check the local spread of disease.
The common element in all these cases is the absence of a
24. See Garton, The State Versus Extraterritorial Pollution - States' "Environmental
Rights" Under Federal Common Law, 2 EcoLouy L.Q. 313, 314 (1972).
25. 200 U.S. 496, 522 (1906).
26. Accord, Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 104-05 (1907). But see Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931) (equal division of the waters of an interstate stream
among the states through which it flows not required).
27. 155 U.S. 461 (1894).
28. 192 U.S. 189 (1904).
29. 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
30. 192 U.S. at 200.
31. 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
32. While the Court specifically cited the health threat from international shipping, it
is apparent that the statute applied equally to interstate shipping. Id. at 459-60.
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motivation for economic advantage in the statutes. Rather than
attempting to achieve an economic gain, the statutes were viewed
as attempts to avoid detrimental effects (health hazards, fraud) to
the general public resulting from interstate trade.
(2) Quasi-Sovereignty
A second line of Supreme Court cases has permitted discrimi-
natory treatment of interstate commerce under the doctrine of
quasi-sovereignty." Quasi-sovereignty is not based on a state's po-
lice power, but rather on its territorial interest and its role as the
ultimate protector of the health and welfare of its inhabitants.
Quasi-sovereignty serves as a substitute for the ultimate ability of
a sovereign nation to resort to physical force.4 Two lines of cases
have emerged under the quasi-sovereignty doctrine. Georgia v. Ten-
nessee Copper Co.,35 a nuisance action to stop crop-damaging fumes
from blowing across the Tennessee-Georgia border, is representative
of one of those lines. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, stated:
In that capacity [quasi-sovereignty] the State has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.
It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their
forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.31
Although Justice Holmes' language in Tennessee Copper clearly
articulates certain state extraterritorial environmental rights, this
line of cases holds that a state generally cannot enforce standards
stricter than those enforced within the state's own borders.37
The second arm of quasi-sovereignty theory suggests a rationale
for uneven treatment of interstate commerce that is appropriate for
analysis of environmental legislation. A line of cases beginning with
Geer v. Connecticut" in 1896 establishes the principle that a state
may prohibit exportation of wild game caught within its borders. On
the theory that wild animals are under the "common ownership" of
all state citizens, federal courts have permitted states to place re-
strictions on procurement of game by individual citizens. In Silz v.
33. For a general discussion of the quasi-sovereignty doctrine, see Bison, Economic
Protective Powers of States Under the Commerce Clause, 38 GEo. L.J. 590, 613-15 (1950);
Garton, supra note 24, at 314-20.
34. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901). See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Garton, supra note 24, at 319.
35. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
36. Id. at 237.
37. See Garton, supra note 24, at 324-27.
38. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); accord, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
404-05 (1948); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13 (1928). See also Johnson
v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 (1928).
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Hesterberg" quasi-sovereignty was held to permit a ban on imports
of game to effectuate an in-state closed season on hunting certain
animals. A comparable result was reached in the recent case
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission,0 in which a difference of $216
in the cost of resident and nonresident elk hunting licenses was held
not to violate either the equal protection or the privileges and im-
munities clauses." Although state attempts to limit resource use for
perceived economic advantage invariably have been invalidated as
commerce clause violations 42 the Supreme Court ruled in Hudson
County Water Co. v. McCarter" that the state has a dominant
interest in fresh water sufficient to prevent exportation for private
gain. The underlying theory of the Court in Hudson County Water
Co. was that "[f]resh waters . . . constitute an important part of
the natural advantages of the [state] upon the faith of which the
population has multiplied in numbers and increased in material
welfare.""
Environmental quality compares with wild game and fresh
water in its aspects of common enjoyment and "ownership" among
all state citizens. Geer and Hudson County Water Co. support the
theory that the state should be allowed to determine the method of
reduction of environmental quality without the interposition of such
federal commerce clause concerns as discrimination against inter-
state commerce.
The current vitality of the quasi-sovereignty doctrine is uncer-
tain. In the recent case Douglas v. Seacoast Products," the Court
dismissed quasi-sovereignty as "a nineteenth century legal fic-
tion."" Two dissenting Justices challenged the majority's treatment
39. 211 U.S. 31 (1908).
40. 98 S.Ct. 1852 (1978).
41. The court declared:
Appellants contend that the doctrine on which. . . Geer . .. relied has no remain-
ing vitality. We do not agree. Only last Term, in referring to the "ownership" or title
language of those cases and characterizing it "as no more than a 19th-century legal
fiction," the Court pointed out that that language nevertheless expressed "'the im-
portance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation
of an important resource.'" Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S., at 284, 97
S.Ct., at 1751, citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S., at 402, 68 S.Ct., at 1165. The fact
that the State's control over wildlife is not exclusive and absolute in the face of federal
regulation and certain federally protected interests does not compel the conclusion that
it is meaningless in their absence.
Id. at 1861.
42. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
43. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
44. See Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 258 (1911).
45. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
46. Id. at 284. See also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948).
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of the doctrine, arguing that a state maintains "substantial pro-
prietary . . . [and] regulatory interests" beyond commerce clause
concerns in the subject matter covered under the quasi-sovereignty
doctrine.17 This dissenting view seems to have gained support in the
more recent case Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission,8 when the
strength of the apparent meaning of Douglas v. Seacoast Products
was eroded by a renewed emphasis on quasi-sovereignty concerns.
Quasi-sovereignty functions in a manner similar to those cases
holding that certain items are not legitimate articles of commerce.
The doctrine has been invoked to validate arguably discriminatory
state legislation when it is perceived to counteract a burden placed
on the state by interstate commerce, rather than create an economic
advantage. The not-legitimate-article-of-commerce cases operate
against the burdens of health hazards and potential fraud. The
quasi-sovereignty cases operate in areas in which state citizens are
said to share a common resource that is threatened by interstate
commercial activity. Both types of cases serve to uphold legislation
which would otherwise be labeled "discriminatory" because they
are perceived to operate against the burdens of interstate commerce
rather than for the benefit of the enacting state. This perception is
clearly a matter of characterization rather than a substantive differ-
ence in the operation of the legislation considered in these two types
of cases. Avoiding a burden imposed by interstate commerce always
results in a benefit to the enacting state. To this extent, differentiat-
ing between probenefit and antiburden statutes is not a useful tool
of logical analysis. The difficulty lies in identifying the point at
which the characterization should shift from probenefit to antibur-
den. The not legitimate article of commerce and quasi-sovereignty
cases do suggest a valid reason for the Court's antiburden character-
ization. The distinguishing element of these cases is the legislations'
subject matter of valueless health hazards, commercial fraud, or
commonly shared natural resources such as wildlife, water, and air.
Commercial activity in these areas can be accompanied by a wide-
spread adverse impact that is difficult or impossible to quantify.
The cost of this adverse impact, or externality" (such as an epi-
demic caused by a health hazard, a crop failure due to the loss of a
water supply, or ecological imbalance caused by overhunting game),
is not included in the final market price of the article and must be
borne by the state. When commerce affecting these areas is
intrastate, the external costs are absorbed by the same state that
47. 431 U.S. at 287-88 (Rehnquist & Powell, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
48. See note 41 supra.
49. The concept of externalities is more fully developed in Part IV infra.
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permits the market activity, and no recourse is needed against com-
merce to recover these unquantifiable costs. When the commerce is
interstate, these adverse externalities are suffered by one state and
its citizens, without compensation, for the direct benefit of the citi-
zens of another. For example, one state could avoid the health risk
of animal carcasses and transfer this risk to another state by pur-
chasing an out-of-state disposal site. It may be argued that when
these externalities clearly have outweighed the value of an article
in commerce-when an article is a valueless health hazard, com-
mercially fraudulent, or has an impact on a commonly shared
natural resource-the Court appropriately changed its characteri-
zation from probenefit to antiburden, thus validating uneven legis-
lation that otherwise would be labeled discriminatory.
(3) City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey
The recent Supreme Court decision in City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey'" directly confronted the issue of state discrimination in
environmental legislation. The challenged legislation in City of
Philadelphia was a ban on the importation of out-of-state solid
waste for disposal in New Jersey land fills. Unequal treatment of
interstate commerce existed because New Jersey continued to use
its land fills for disposing in-state garbage. While the matter is not
free from doubt, the statute apparently was intended to mitigate the
rapid exhaustion of existing landfill sites1 and the attendant prob-
lems of finding suitable alternatives for garbage disposal.
The New Jersey Supreme Court found the statute constitu-
tional.52 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the statute impermissibly discriminated against interstate com-
merce for protectionist reasons. In reversing the New Jersey deci-
sion, the Court failed to recognize the distinction between economic
50. 98 S.Ct. 2531 (1978).
51. Opponents to the ban on out-of-state waste contended that the New Jersey legisla-
ture's motivation was primarily financial. 98 S.Ct. at 2536-37. New Jersey had reached a
critical situation in which existing landfill sites were being rapidly filled and an insufficient
number of acceptable new sites were available. In the Hackensack area 10,000 tons of garbage
per week out of a total 55,000 tons came from out-of-state sources. In 1971 a state survey
estimated New Jersey buried 1.5 million tons of out-of-state solid waste. The same survey
estimated that a ban on out-of-state solid waste would extend existing landfill life by an
average of eight percent with the life of certain landfills as much as doubled. Extending the
life of the landfills was deemed crucial to avoid despoiling new flood plains, tideland, and
wetlands areas, and to give projected new techniques for handling solid waste a chance to be
implemented. The court also mentioned that landfills limit future ability to build on the land.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 68 N.J. 451, 465-72 (1975).
52. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 68 N.J. 451 (1975), remanded, 430 U.S. 141
(1977), reversed, 98 S.Ct. 2531 (1978).
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protectionist legislation and legislation seeking to avoid harm im-
posed by interstate commerce. The Court attempted to distinguish
the line of cases permitting uneven state regulation of illegitimate
articles of commerce, and failed even to mention the doctrine of
quasi-sovereignty.5 3
The Court's distinction of the illegitimate articles of commerce
cases seriously weakens their potential value as support for discrimi-
natory state environmental legislation. The Court stated that an
article's legitimacy in interstate commerce was a conclusion, not a
threshold issue, and that"[a]ll objects of interstate trade merit
Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the
outset."" Consequently, the Court asserted that the New Jersey
opinion "misread""5 the illegitimate articles of commerce cases,
which the Court claimed actually resulted from a balancing" of an
article's worth in interstate commerce against "the dangers inhering
in their very movement."" The Court concluded that "[t]hose laws
thus did not discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but
simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin.""
Unfortunately, the Court's distinctions do not withstand analy-
sis.6' While the Court's "dangers inherent in their very movement"
theory adequately differentiates such health hazard articles as dead
carcasses"o or potential spreaders of disease," the relevant cases
cover a number of different types of articles. For example, the
"dangers inherent in the very movement" of unripe citrus fruit,"
butter-colored margarine, 3 or deceptively colored coffee beans are
not apparent." Similarly, there is no clear indication in the cases
that in-state traffic in the regulated articles was subject to the same
restrictions as interstate traffic. The legislation singling out inter-
state commerce cannot be explained by a general fear of all traffic
in the articles; enactments based on such a motive would logically
include intrastate traffic as well. Also, as Justice Rehnquist pointed
53. The New Jersey Supreme Court had employed quasi-sovereignty as a ground for
their opinion. 68 N.J. at 477-78.
54. 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. See text accompanying notes 77-93 infra (for an explanation of the balancing pro-
cess).
57. 98 S.Ct. at 2535, 2538.
58. Id. at 2538.
59. Justice Rehnquist in dissent said that the illegitimate articles of commerce cases
were indistinguishable. Id. at 2540.
60. Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939).
61. Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888).
62. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
63. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894).
64. Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U.S. 189, 196 (1904).
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out in dissent, it is difficult to perceive why garbage itself does not
meet the new standard of "dangers inherent in its very move-
ment.""
The basis for the Court's decision appears to rest on the finding
that the statute was discriminatory because it affected the flow of
commerce for protectionist reasons." Asserting that a state may not
"isolate itself from a problem common to many," the Court found
the statute unconstitutionally discriminatory in That it placed the
full burden of conserving landfill sites on out-of-state commercial
interests. 7 This language parallels the traditional characterization
in negative commerce clause analysis of economic protectionist leg-
islation-restrictions on the flow of commerce are burdens on inter-
state commerce that benefit the enacting state." When these re-
strictions are not evenhanded, they are deemed discriminatory.
The City of Philadelphia Court is guilty of the same type of
conclusory reasoning that it ascribed to the New Jersey court's de-
termination that an item is not a legitimate article of commerce.
The Court focused exclusively on the economic impact of the legisla-
tion on interstate commerce by looking at the burden of conserving
landfill sites. From this perspective the Court inevitably concluded
that the legislation perpetuated economic protectionism and was
thus "discriminatory." While this conclusion is accurate, its appli-
cation produces anomalous results. For example, if this perspective
were applied to the Morgan's S.S. Co. quarantine case,7 the Court
would have found that the quarantine laws were invalidly discrimi-
natory because they sought to avoid the economic consequences of
cholera.
The adverse externalities of garbage and its lack of a market
value warrant use of the same antiburden characterization for the
City of Philadelphia legislation that the Court employed in the
quasi-sovereignty and not-legitimate-article-of-commerce cases.
The Court's focus on limitations to the free flow of commerce as
burdens to commerce that benefit the state ignores the reciprocal
65. 98 S.Ct. at 2540 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2538.
67. Id.
68. See Part II(B) infra.
69. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
70. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text. It should also be noted that the
Court's characterization of the "burden" as that of conserving landfill sites points out an
inconsistency in the opinion. If landfill site conservation constituted the burden, then the
Court should have referred to interstate commerce in landfill sites. This would have been an
accurate reference, for it was not the garbage that was being bought and sold, but space in
the landfill. The Court, however, consistently referred to interstate commerce in solid waste.
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nature of the process. When garbage and similar articles in inter-
state commerce have adverse externalities clearly in excess of the
price received by the disposing state, interstate commerce is bur-
dening the state. In fact, landfill conservation is a burden only
because garbage is a burden. The New Jersey court identified the
adverse externalities of difficult disposal, exhaustion of finite land-
fill sites, and hazard to health that accompany garbage.7 ' Any
state that permits the exportation of garbage receives the direct
economic benefit of avoiding these adverse externalities. The ex-
porting state is thus guilty of economic protectionism, which in
the legislative context has always produced a judicial finding of
discrimination, by permitting or encouraging garbage to enter the
flow of interstate commerce, thereby causing another state to bear
the adverse externalities of the garbage it has created. 2 In the
Court's words, the exporting state is seeking to "isolate itself from
a problem common to many." 3 The exporting state's protectionism
is easily obscured by the traditional reference to the abstract gener-
ality of "interstate commerce," rather than the movement of arti-
cles from one state into another.
The Court instinctively recognized this fact under the not-
legitimate-article-of-commerce rubric and in quasi-sovereignty
cases. These cases appropriately differentiated between protection-
ism for economic gain and protectionism to avoid harm to the gen-
eral public. Upholding a law banning burdensome articles of com-
merce forces the state with the potential burden to combat it inter-
nally, rather than releasing the objectionable article into interstate
commerce and placing the burden ultimately upon another state.
The quasi-sovereignty cases act similarly by demarking areas of
concern in which the state's interests are sovereign to another state's
ability to impose a burden, under the protection of the negative
commerce clause. Both rationales have been invoked when the ad-
verse externalities of a market activity clearly exceed the market
price. The Court's present characterization of discrimination in City
of Philadelphia is blind to the reciprocal nature of the effects of
interstate commerce in articles that are valueless and/or present
health or environmental hazards. The practical effect of City of
Philadelphia is to limit severely the possibility of uneven state envi-
71. 68 N.J. at 460.
72. Justice Rehnquist in dissent pointed out that a state's need to combat local prob-
lems should not lead to a forced acceptance of out-of-state problems. 98 S.Ct. at 2540.
73. Id. at 2538.
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ronmental legislation, thus encouraging the transportation of envi-
ronmental problems rather than their solution."
B. Benefit-Burden Analysis
(1) The Methods of Analysis
Once the Court determines that a statute operates without dis-
crimination, the next stage in negative commerce clause analysis is
a weighing of the legislation's benefits to the state against its bur-
dens on interstate commerce. Because of the variety of factors used
and the varying weight given to those factors, however, a consistent
analytical approach cannot be found in the Supreme Court cases
that engage in this balancing process. The Supreme Court itself has
referred to benefit-burden analysis as "variously stated." 5 Other
courts and commentators have used less restrained terminology. 6
The central unsettled question emerging from the Supreme Court
cases is whether a candid, direct judicial weighing of benefits and
burdens will occur; and if so, at what stage in the analysis.
For state environmental legislation, there are three important
versions of benefit-burden analysis. The first was articulated by
Justice Stewart for a unanimous Court in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Incorporated." Justice Stewart defined the "general rule that
emerges" in benefit-burden analysis:
Where the [state] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits . . . . If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of
the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities?9
74. Id. The Court stated that its decision also provided protection for any future New
Jersey decision to export its garbage to Pennsylvania. The impact of this statement is unclear.
Does it mean that a state must provide disposal facilities for out-of-state garbage, despite
the fact that it exports all in-state garbage? At what point does out-of-state garbage become
in-state garbage, so it can be "reexported" to the state of origin? When can the original state
send it back? Can Pennsylvania dump all its garbage in Delaware and simply accommodate
Delaware's garbage in return? Can a group of states select a single state as a dump? These
vital questions remain unanswered.
75. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
76. Procter & Gamble v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69, 75 (1975) ("difficult to discern");
American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691, 697 (Ct. App. 1973) ("not
always consistent"); Note, The Challenge to Oregon's Bottle Bill: American Can Company
v. O.L.C.C., 4 ENVT'L L. 419, 424 (1974) ("difficult to reconcile").
77. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
78. Id. at 142.
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Justice Stewart's statement articulates the five basic areas of
benefit-burden analysis: discrimination ("evenhandedly"); a legiti-
mate public purpose; statutory means related to the legislative pur-
pose ("effectuate"); a direct weighing of burdens and benefits (here
under a "clearly excessive" standard); and less restrictive alterna-
tives to the legislation. While the Pike Court does not expressly
admit to a balancing process of burdens and benefits, it is implicit
in a determination that burdens are not "clearly excessive" in rela-
tion to local benefits. Although the Court attempted to differentiate
between this test and those cases in which a balancing candidly
occurred," the practical effect of the last sentence of the test is the
creation of a general benefit-burden balancing that negates the par-
ticularity of the rest of the test. Although the test purports to be a
detailed analysis, the resulting decision in reality is nothing more
than a judicial conclusion as to whether the state benefits justify the
burden the statute imposes on interstate commerce.
A second version of the benefit-burden analysis suggests that
the subject matter of the state legislation will determine if a balanc-
ing will take place."o Two years before Pike, the Court in
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Railroad (Firemen)" expressly rejected a lower
court finding that the financial burden of complying with an Arkan-
sas full train crew law was "'out of all proportion to the benefit, if
any, derived' . . . . "6 The Court stated that "the District Court
indulged in a legislative judgment wholly beyond its limited author-
ity to review state legislation under the Commerce Clause."83 In
explanation, the Court reasoned that the question of safety is a
matter of public policy to be determined only by the legislature. The
judiciary, the Court continued, is not authorized to resolve conflicts
in the evidence against the legislature's conclusion, especially on
inconclusive evidence." The Court described the process of balanc-
ing financial losses against "lives and limbs" as "difficult at best,"
and concluded that "[w]e certainly cannot do so on this show-
ing."85
Despite Firemen's language, it is apparent that the Court en-
gaged in the same type of balancing process for which it criticized
79. Id. (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)).
80. This process should not be confused with the weight given a legislation's benefits
in the balancing process.
81. 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
82. Id. at 136.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 138-39.
85. Id. at 140.
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the district court. In labeling the balancing process "difficult" and
the evidence of the statute's safety "inconclusive," the Court dem-
onstrated that it too was weighing the evidence of the statute's
benefits. Had the Court deemed the balance of safety against finan-
cial losses less "difficult," or the evidence against the statute's
safety "conclusive," it would have agreed with the district court.
The Court employed a balancing process, but simply reached a
different conclusion than the district court."8
In Breard v. Alexandria,87 the Court purported to refrain from
a balancing process because of the subject matter of the legislation.
The Louisiana statute in question operated to protect the privacy
of local residents from door-to-door solicitors, most of whom carried
on an interstate trade. The Court upheld the statute, stating that
"[w]hen there is a reasonable basis for legislation to protect the
social as distinguished from the economic, welfare of a community,
it is not for this Court because of the Commerce Clause to deny the
exercise locally of the sovereign power of Louisiana."" A balancing
process is implicit in this statement, however, with social welfare
benefits viewed as inevitably outweighing burdens on interstate
commerce.
In addition to the balancing and subject matter approaches, a
third variation of the benefit-burden standard was expressed in
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,8" which considered a com-
merce clause challenge to environmental legislation. Justice Stew-
art, who later authored the Pike opinion, declared that the issue of
burden on interstate commerce "needs no extended discussion.
State regulation, based on the police power, which does not discrim-
inate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required
uniformity may constitutionally stand."o In Huron the balancing of
benefits and burdens was summarily dismissed." This decision,
however, can also be viewed as the result of a balancing process: in
the absence of any disruption of uniform regulation of interstate
commerce, the statute's burden was deemed not to outweigh its
benefits to the state.
In interpreting these various benefit-burden tests, the lower
courts have not acknowledged the balancing process inherent in
86. See Note, supra note 76, at 423 (reaching the same conclusion).
87. 341 U.S. 622 (1951). The challenged statute was a municipal ban on door-to-door
solicitation of magazine subscriptions.
88. Id. at 640.
89. 362 U.S. 440 (1960). The boilers on two of appeallants' ships engaging in interstate
commerce violated Detroit's Smoke Abatement Code.




each. Instead, they have attempted a literal application of the ele-
ments of the tests, resulting in a great deal of confusion and the
frequent transposition of the elements of the various tests. This lack
of clarity is apparent in the two most significant judicial treatments
of negative commerce clause challenges to state environmental leg-
islation-American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission92
and Procter & Gamble v. City of Chicago."
(2) Application of the Analysis to Environmental Legislation
(a) American Can
The landmark case American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Commission demonstrates the difficulties in applying commerce
clause precedent and benefit-burden analysis to environmental leg-
islation. The Oregon appellate court paralleled the Firemen deci-
sion, applying a balancing approach while purporting not to. The
Oregon statute under attack imposed a deposit and refund system
for all beer and soft drink containers and a total prohibition on pop-
top cans for the stated legislative purpose of reducing litter, solid
waste, and injuries from discarded pop-tops." The Oregon court
declared the statute to be a legitimate exercise of police power (thus
satisfying the second concern of the Pike test'5 ) with a conclusory
approach typical of environmental commerce clause cases." The
weakness of this conclusory finding of a legitimate state purpose for
benefit-burden analysis is that the mere presence of a legitimate
state purpose is not significant; the significance lies in a value judg-
ment by the court in evaluating the purpose's degree of legitimacy
when balanced against the statute's burden on interstate commerce.
The overriding significance of this value judgment is indicated in
the final segment of the Pike test, in which the burden that will be
tolerated is a function of the nature of the local interest served."
Thus judicial evaluation of the difference between burden and bene-
fit requires a value judgment with regard to the importance of the
benefit.
The Oregon court claimed that it was not engaging in a balanc-
ing process, however, stating that balancing was not compelled by
92. 517 P.2d 691 (1973).
93. 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
94. 517 P.2d at 694.
95. See text accompanying note 78 supra. See also notes 72-73 supra and accompanying
text.
96. 517 P.2d at 698. See also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442
(1960).
97. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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Pike and that Firemen rejected balancing in cases in which statu-
tory benefits could not be successfully compared with the burdens
imposed on interstate commerce." The court determined that the
economic loss to the beverage industry was incomparable with the
benefits of reducing personal injury, litter, and solid waste." The
court did not acknowledge Firemen's unadmitted balancing, nor did
it mention that Firemen did not conclusively reject the balancing
process, but rather deemed the weighing of incomparables
"difficult."100 The court underscored its misreading of Firemen by
stating that gross disparity between the burden and benefit of a
statute would be apparent "without going through the motions of a
judicial weighing process."101 Yet to establish any disparity, judicial
evaluation of the legislative interest must take place, and a balanc-
ing must occur.
The American Can court supported its conclusion that only
comparable benefits and burdens should be weighed by citing the
"comparables" weighed in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., o2
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 03 and Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison."o' A reading of these cases indicates that although the
Court balanced comparables in the process of evaluating least re-
strictive alternatives, it also balanced health and safety against
economic burdens."' American Can thus used a comparison of less
restrictive alternatives in previous cases to support its refusal to
balance "non-comparables," and dismissed the consideration of less
restrictive alternatives as a legislative judgment not subject to judi-
cial review.'
Although American Can articulated an unwillingness to bal-
ance the benefits and burdens of the legislation, the court neverthe-
less transposed this balancing process to its evaluation of possible
economic discrimination by the statute. After pointing out that the
98. 517 P.2d at 697.
99. Id. at 697-98.
100. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
101. 517 P.2d at 698.
102. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
103. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
104. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
105. An evaluation of least restrictive alternatives is called for in the Pike test: "And
the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities." 397 U.S. at 142.
106. 517 P.2d at 700. Independent of its decision not to balance, the court also consid-
ered whether the statute created an unconstitutional impediment on the free flow of interstate
commerce. The court found a sua sponte distinction between the goods transported and the




bottle bill was not discriminatory per se because it had a negative
impact on interstate commerce, the court said: "[I]t is appropriate
to look to the nature of the economic burden upon interstate com-
merce and the legislative motivation in creating that burden. A
gross disparity would tend to evidence police power coloration to an
act of economic protectionism."o'0 In determining that no legislative
intent to discriminate existed,' the court described with apparent
approval the precise legislative weighing process behind the bottle
bill:
Economic loss restricted to certain elements of the beverage industry must be
viewed in relation to the broader loss to the general public of the state of
Oregon which the legislature sought, by enactment of the bottle bill, to avoid.
The availability of land and revenues for solid waste disposal, the cost of litter
collection on our highways and in our public parks, the depletion of mineral
and energy resources, the injuries to humans and animals caused by discarded
pull tops, and the esthetic blight on our landscape, are all economic, safety
and esthetic burdens of great consequence which must be borne by every
member of the public. The legislature attached higher significance to the cost
to the public than they did to the cost to the beverage industry and we have
no cause to disturb that legislative determination."
Despite a claimed unwillingness to balance "non-comparables," the
court's agreement with such a legislative balancing process demon-
strates a similar, if unadmitted process undertaken by the court
under a deferential standard.
(b) Procter & Gamble v. City of Chicago
The Seventh Circuit case of Procter & Gamble v. City of
Chicago0 again demonstrates the courts' difficulty in balancing the
benefit of an environmental statute against its burden on interstate
commerce. The Procter & Gamble court actually adhered to the
common interpretation of Firemen, declining to balance benefits
and burdens while purporting to apply a variation of the Pike stan-
dard. In an analysis best described as confusing, the court stated
that Pike called for a balancing process with regard to the effective-
ness of the statute in achieving the legislative goal, yet the court
failed to engage in an overall balancing of general benefits and
burdens.
107. Id. at 702.
108. The court based its ultimate finding that the bottle bill did not discriminate on
the presence of a legitimate legislative intent and on the evenhanded effects of the bill on
both in-state and foreign bottlers. The court reasoned that the bill's impact on bottlers was
determined by proximity to Oregon markets (Portland, Oregon's largest city, is on the Wash-
ington border) and not state lines. Id. at 703.
109. Id. at 702-03.
110. 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
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Procter & Gamble considered the validity of a Chicago ordi-
nance intended to reduce eutrophication"' of the Chicago River by
banning the use of phospate laundry detergents. Plaintiffs, who lost
$4.7 million in sales in the first five months of the ban,"2 raised
significant technical questions whether phosphorous produced eu-
trophication and whether a reduction in the water's phosphorous
content would reduce algae growth."3 The court acknowledged the
first two areas of possible balancing-a legitimate state purpose and
a reasonable means to achieve that purpose" '-yet appeared con-
fused in applying the two facets of the balance. While most courts
question whether environmental protection is a legitimate interest"
and whether the legislation effectuates that interest, the Procter &
Gamble court either ignored or assumed the fundamental question
of legitimacy of environmental protection and instead evaluated
whether reduced eutrophication was a legitimate interest. Ordinar-
ily, a court would have analyzed eutrophication in terms of the
legislation's effectiveness in protecting the environment. Instead,
the Pike "effectiveness" element was accomplished through an eval-
uation of plaintiff's concerns about a phosphate ban's technical and
chemical ability to achieve eutrophication reduction. The technical
effectiveness has not been at issue in other environmental cases.",
In evaluating the legislative purpose, the court interpreted
Firemen as holding that issues such as the benefits of algae removal
were policy questions not for judicial evaluation."7 Such an inter-
pretation fails to recognize that the Firemen balancing language was
directed at the general balancing concerns of whether a statute's
benefits outweigh its burdens on interstate commerce, and not at a
determination of a legitimate legislative purpose. The court noted
the apparent split of authority between Pike, which called for a
general benefit-burden balancing under a "clearly excessive" stan-
dard, and Firemen, which would eliminate this step."' The court
resolved the conflict by declaring that the Pike "clearly excessive"
balancing standard should be applied to whether the statutory
111. Eutrophication is the growth of nuisance algae.
112. 509 F.2d at 73.
113. Id. at 73-74.
114. Id. at 75 n.6.
115. See, e.g., Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); American Can Co. v.
Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691 (Ct. App. 1973).
116. For example, an equivalent "technical" evaluation of the American Can bottle ban
would consider whether a ban on one-way bottles would reduce the number of one-way
bottles.




means (banning phosphate) were reasonably related to the legisla-
tive purpose, i.e., did phosphate reduce algae. The court thus trans-
formed the general balancing of a statute's burdens and benefits in
Pike into an analysis of the technical effectiveness of the statute."'
Despite their espoused adherence to Firemen, the Seventh Cir-
cuit achieved the practical equivalent of Pike by evaluating the
degree of burden imposed by the phosphate ban. After detailing the
consequences of the ban, 2 0 the court further confused ordinary nega-
tive commerce clause analysis by reversing the "less restrictive al-
ternatives" test. The court concluded that the burden on commerce
was slight"' because interstate commerce could reduce the impact
of the phosphate ban through alternate marketing techniques.122
Thus, by characterizing the burden on interstate commerce as slight
because alternatives were available, and by finding a legitimate
legislative goal, the court implicitly found that the statute met the
"clearly excessive" test applied in a balancing of benefits and bur-
dens.
(3) Summary
Decisions attempting to evaluate statutory benefits and bur-
dens are not clear. Pike calls for a judicial balancing of a statute's
benefits and burdens, Firemen engages in a balancing in the very
act of forbidding balancing, and Huron and Breard dismiss the
balancing process, despite articulating ways of evaluating benefits
(Breard's social welfare) or burdens (Huron's uniformity). When
applied to environmental legislation, the confusion of this authority
is amplified by the variety of potential areas in which to engage the
balancing process, as demonstrated in American Can and Procter
& Gamble. American Can rejected a balancing of benefits and bur-
dens, and then articulated a balancing process in its evaluation of
the statute's discriminatory effect. Procter & Gamble injected an
unprecedented evaluation of the statute's technical effectiveness
and applied a balancing test to this new concern. Procter & Gamble
119. Id. The court paraphrased the standard as "clear and convincing proof." Id. at 76.
See text accompanying note 78 supra.
120. The primary consequence was a refusal by regional distributors to stock both
phosphate and nonphosphate formulas for the same detergent. 509 F.2d at 73.
121. The court reached this conclusion by initially recognizing the means-goods distinc-
tion drawn in American Can. The court concluded that the regulation of goods was an
acceptable interference with the free flow of commerce. The validity of the means-goods
distinction as an analytical tool was weakened, however, when the court separately evaluated
the free flow of phosphate detergents. See note 106 supra.
122. Id. at 76-77. Other cases have evaluated alternatives to the state legislation, not
alternatives to interstate commerce. This reversal of the least restrictive alternative test has
been noted in Note, American Can: Judicial Response to Oregon's Nonreturnable Container
Legislation, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 145, 158 (1974).
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also reversed the least restrictive alternative test, applying it to
interstate commerce instead of to the state legislation. Most impor-
tantly, American Can and Procter & Gamble demonstrate the need
for clarity in negative commerce clause analysis of state environ-
mental legislation.
III. THE TAx STANDARD
By comparison with benefit-burden analysis, the judicial
standard for reviewing tax cases under the negative commerce
clause is straightforward and easily applied. The courts are not
concerned with weighing a statute's benefits and detriments; they
simply evaluate if and to what extent a tax can be levied. The
state's ability to tax interstate commerce is not in question. In the
seminal case Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue'4 the Su-
preme Court declared that interstate commerce could be required
under the commerce clause to beak its "just share of state tax
burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business."'24
The current commerce clause standard for judging state taxation
was expressed recently in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.'2I
The standard implicitly applied in Complete Auto Transit and gen-
erally applicable to tax cases requires a substantial nexus between
the taxed activity and the state, fair apportionment of the tax, a
fair relation between the amount of tax and the services provided
by the state, and no discrimination against interstate commerce.,"
Similar concerns are reflected when courts evaluate tax imposed
as a charge for the use of state-owned facilities. The Court in
Evansville- Vanderburg Airport v. Delta Airlines,2 an action chal-
lenging a charge for the use of airport facilities, required that the
charge not be discriminatory, that it reflect "a fair if, imperfect,
approximation of the use of facilities for whose benefit they are
imposed," 28 and that it not be excessive in relation to the costs
incurred by the taxing authorities.129
In Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement
Commission,'3" the tax standard was applied to a state environmen-
tal tax statute. The Maine legislation provided for a one-half cent
123. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
124. Id. at 254.
125. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
126. The Court mentioned these four factors three times with apparent approval. Id.
at 277-78, 279, 287.
127. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
128. Id. at 717.
129. Id. at 719.
130. 307 A.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973).
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per- barrel license fee on petroleum transfers that required the use
of shore terminals and ships over a minimum size. The tax provided
the initial funding for a maximum four million dollar protection
fund intended to finance clean-up operations and third party com-
pensation in the event of an oil spill. Because the statute operated
as a tax, benefit-burden analysis was unnecessary and the com-
merce clause challenge was resolved with relative simplicity.
The Maine court first addressed the issue whether a contribu-
tion to a provisional clean-up fund constituted a "fair share" of the
state's tax burden that could be imposed on interstate commerce."'
The Portland Pipe court differentiated between taxes imposed as
general revenue device and those levied as part of a regulatory
scheme,132 but cited Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison33 for the
proposition that the cost of preventing and remedying the harm
caused by inherent dangers in interstate commerce was included in
the "just share" of the tax burden that could be imposed as a regula-
tion. 3 Dean Milk invalidated a discriminatory milk inspection ordi-
nance that effectively banned out-of-state milk from the city of
Madison. In examining reasonable alternatives to the discrimina-
tory ordinance, the Supreme Court in Dean Milk indicated a per-
missible alternative would have been for out-of-state milk to be
inspected locally and the cost of inspection imposed on those en-
gaged in interstate commerce.'" The Portland Pipe court concluded
that the fund financed through the oil transfer tax was an analagous
solution and that the just share of the cost of alleviating the poten-
tial hazard through the clean-up fund could be imposed on inter-
state commerce. In addition, the court noted that the Supreme
Court had upheld similar charges for the costs of harbor administra-
tion 3 and quarantine inspection.'
In evaluating the actual amount of the tax, the Maine court
applied two elements of the Delta Airlines3 test to find that the fees
were neither discriminatory nor excessive in relation to potential
cost. The second part of the Portland Pipe test, however, differed
significantly from the Delta Airlines test. Delta Airlines, which up-
held use fees for publicly owned airport facilities, required that such
charges reflect "a fair, if imperfect, approximation of the use of
131. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
132. 307 A.2d at 37.
133. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
134. 307 A.2d at 37.
135. 340 U.S. at 354-55.
136. Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 (1935).
137. Morgan's S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
138. See notes 127-28 supra and accompanying text.
19791 935
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
facilities for whose benefit they are imposed.""' Portland Pipe re-
quired that the charges represent a fair approximation of "the con-
duct which gives rise to the danger against which the Act seeks to
guard."4 0 The court thus considered the environment (the ocean
and shoreline) to be a state facility and equated even the potential
degradation of the environment with a use of that facility for which
a reasonable fee could be charged. By inference, a reasonable fee
could also be charged for actual environmental damage if the other
facets of the Delta Airlines test were met. Portland Pipe thus con-
sidered the costs of guarding against and correcting environmental
damage to be state expenditures for which commerce may be asked
to bear its fair share.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAcT AS AN EXTERNALTY
The clarity of the Portland Pipe analysis, when compared with
American Can and Procter & Gamble, results from Maine's reduc-
tion of the benefit-burden balancing between petroleum trade and
an oil-free coast to a precise amount-a tax. The statute permits oil
transfers to continue if they will pay a fair approximation of the
costs related to their presence. A tax, in contrast to a prohibition,
avoids an either/or situation in which the court must balance state
benefits against commerce burdens, and in which either the com-
merce or the state interest must prevail, to the exclusion of the
other. As American Can and Procter & Gamble reveal, this subjec-
tive assessment is made whether or not the court admits to a balanc-
ing process."' Portland Pipe demonstrates the conceptual reversal
of the regulatory burden-benefit balancing process for negative com-
merce clause analysis in the tax cases. Whereas regulations are con-
ceived of as "benefiting" the state and "burdening" commerce,
thereby triggering judicial balancing, tax statutes are viewed as
"unburdening" the state of "costs" and "unbenefiting" interstate
commerce, which before the tax has not paid its "just share" of
these costs."' The reciprocal nature of these characterizations is
similar to that described in the area of discrimination."' The valid-
139. 405 U.S. at 717 (emphasis added).
140. 307 A.2d at 38 (emphasis added). The court found that the limitation of the tax
to larger vessels fairly approximated the likely source of damage.
141. See notes 107-09 & 119-22 supra and accompanying text.
142. Language in American Can suggests the Oregon court intuitively reversed these
concepts without acknowledgment. The Oregon legislature was persuaded that the economic
benefit to the beverage industry brought with it "deleterious consequences to the environment
and additional costs to the public . . . . [Tihe attendant economic and aesthetic burden to
the public outweighed the narrower economic benefit to the industry." 517 P.2d at 696
(emphasis added).
143. See notes 66-74 supra and accompanying text.
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ity-of imposing such a tax on interstate commerce is clear.",
The difference between benefiting a state and unburdening it
at first appears to be characterization rather than substance. Given
that courts persist in employing this distinction, an obvious incen-
tive is created for state legislatures to enact environmental legisla-
tion in the form of a tax to utilize the more permissive tax analysis
rather than the uncertain benefit-burden analysis. But when viewed
according to the economic concept of externalities, all state environ-
mental legislation, whether tax or regulation, can be viewed as
"unburdening" the state of costs imposed by interstate commerce.
In promulgating environmentally motivated tax or regulatory
legislation, a legislature initially must make a value judgment that
the environmental impact constitutes an actionable detriment. This
judgment creates problems both in defining the problem and evalu-
ating the degree of harm. A preliminary inquiry is required under
present negative commerce clause analysis as to whether a state
legislature is permitted to make this value judgment."' Characteriz-
ing environmental change as a detriment is a value judgment, al-
though society's use of such value-laden terms as "pollution" and
"degradation" often disguises that fact."' This initial value judg-
ment is not free from controversy. Views asserting the primacy of
environmental values have been criticized as leading to a rejection
of rationality in conflict resolution. 47 In contrast, rational compari-
son and ranking of the environment has been said to transform "an
inchoate sense of obligation towards natural objects . . . into an
aspect of [homocentric] self-interest." 48 Religious and philosophi-
cal rationales for environmental protection 4' have been dismissed
as "naive and elegaic celebration[s] of an irrelevant vision," and
"[i]ntellectual hostility to urban life."5 0
Change to an interdependent ecology'5' is not harmful per se;
harm will only exist after the change is deemed undesirable.'" Re-
gardless of this debate, it is significant for commerce clause pur-
144. See notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
145. This is reflected in the Pike test inquiry of "legitimate state interest." See text
accompanying note 78 supra.
146. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
147. Tarlock, supra note 2, at 459.
148. Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environ-
mental Law, 83 YALz L.J. 1315, 1332 (1974); see Tarlock, supra note 2, at 460.
149. These rationales are summarized in Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental
Thought: Some Sources and Some Criticisms, 50 IND. L.J. 426, 427-39 (1975).
150. Tarlock, supra note 2, at 457-58.
151. This term is used to describe the naturally occurring factors and processes that
support life. See Tarlock, supra note 2, at 462.
152. Id. at 462.
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poses that environmental legislation is deemed a legitimate area of
legislative concern. This need to justify the legislative purpose is the
first factor expressed in the Pike test: is the legislature permitted
to interpret environmental impact as a burden or cost? Courts con-
sidering the issue have all answered in the affirmative. The environ-
ment seems to have kept pace with aesthetics in its rise from a
position clearly outside the "police power"" to its present status as
an independently legitimate subject of legislation. It no longer is
necessary to relate the environment to traditional areas of legisla-
tive interest-the "police power" concerns of health and safety." A
legislative decision that environmental impact is a detriment sim-
ply reflects the large scale shift of public attitude from resource
exploitation to environmental conservation. 5 Huron explicitly held
the environment to be a legitimate legislative area. Other courts
have either assumed the point or echoed Huron. 6 Legislatures are
thus free to determine that given environmental impact is a detri-
ment.
The concept of externalities 15 demonstrates why interstate
commerce should legitimately bear the effects of environmental leg-
islation. Externalities, also termed social costs, have been defined
as the use of resources without cost to the user, but at a cost to
others.' According to free market economics,' consumers deter-
mine the proper allocation of resources by purchasing goods and
services to the point at which the cost of an additional item will
equal the value of an alternative purchase.' The price of an item
should depend on both its relative desirability and its relative scarc-
ity."' If the price of an item fails to include the costs perceived by
153. Police power is a conclusory term used to describe permissible areas of state legisla-
tion under the federal Constitution. See Garton, Ecology and the Police Power, 16 S.D. L.
REv. 261, 263-67 (1971).
154. Id. See also Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police
Power, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 149 (1954).
155. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
156. Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960); American Can Co. v.
Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691, 698 (Ct. App. 1973).
157. This Note does not attempt to give an exhaustive treatment of externality theory.
Its aim is to provide sufficient background so that the general principles of the concept of
externalities can be applied to negative commerce clause analysis of environmental legisla-
tion. For more complete treatment of externalities, see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960); Johnson, Meade, Bees, and Externalities, 16 J.L. & EcoN. 35 (1973);
Smith, Relative Prices, Technical Change, and Environmental Preservation, 15 NAT. RE-
souRcEs J. 283 (1975).
158. Meyers, supra note 149, at 446.
159. H. SEDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLEs OF PoLrrlcAL EcONomy 406 (1st ed. 1883), cited in
Johnson, supra note 157, at 35.
160. Johnson, supra note 157, at 36.
161. Meyers, supra note 149, at 448.
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others as imposed on them by objectionable side-effects of produc-
ing the item,1 2 the market inaccurately undervalues the item in
relation to alternative purchases that have all their costs reflected
in their price. For example, purchasers pay less than the full price
for a can of beer, because the dollar cost of production and the
selling price do not include the eventual cost of disposal of the
empty containers.
When damage to a resource is not reflected in the price of the
item that causes that damage, the market fails to ration the re-
source to reflect its scarcity.' If anything, the use of a resource
without cost to the user (the resource being, for example, a landfill,
an unlittered roadside, clean water, or clean beaches) encourages
use of that resource by cheapening the product's ultimate market
price. If the use of landfills or the creation of roadside litter carries
no price and thus creates no cost for a beverage bottler, what bottler
would self-impose the dollar expense, competitive disadvantage,
and inconvenience of returnable bottles?
Externality theory states that in a perfect system efficient allo-
cation of resources results if all those objecting to an externality pay
the resource user to alter his conduct.' The competing value judg-
ments between the environment and cheaper products can be re-
solved in the market place. Those desiring a clean roadside can pay
a bottler the extra cost of marketing the beverage in returnable
bottles.
At least two imperfections in the system, however, prevent this
theory from working in practice. First, the transaction costs of con-
tacting and assembling the litter objectors to collect a large number
of small payments may be prohibitive, leaving insufficient funds to
pay the bottler.' Second, the dollar "votes" against an externality
like litter will not reflect the total number of people and the total
dollar amount each theoretically would pay to eliminate beverage
container litter because of the "free rider" problem. Each individual
has an incentive not to pay the full value for him to be free of bottle
litter because he will receive the full benefit of a litter-free environ-
162. One commentator has noted:
If factors of production are thought of as rights [and not only physical entities], it
becomes easier to understand that the right to do something which has a harmful effect
(such as the creation of smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a factor of production . . . .
The cost of exercising a right (of using a factor of production) is always the loss which is
suffered elsewhere in consequence of the exercise of that right . . . .
Coase, supra note 157, at 44.
163. This analysis is found in Meyers, supra note 149, at 448.
164. Coase, supra note 157, at 2-6; Meyers, supra note 149, at 448.
165. Coase, supra note 157, at 10; Meyers, supra note 149, at 448-49.
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ment whether he pays or not."'
For various reasons, among them the transaction costs and the
"free rider" problem, a free market economy does not operate and
objectionable externalities are not appropriately reduced or elimi-
nated through free market operations." Governmental interference
through legislation is the traditional solution to such economic
problems as externalities." For example, the coastal protection
fund in Portland Pipe represents a governmental attempt to place
a price on the use of an externality because the market failed to
price the resource use. The appropriate cost"' imposed by interstate
commerce on the state is internalized when it is properly reflected
in the ultimate market price of the goods.
A prohibition of an interstate commerce item such as disposa-
ble containers, in contrast to a tax, appears superficially to be a
proscriptive value judgment qualitatively different than the inter-
nalization of an externality through a tax. This is a misconception
reflected in judicial evaluation. Regulatory prohibitions receive the
complicated benefit-burden analysis while taxes face a far simpler
and less subjective review. The difference between a tax and a regu-
lation, however, is one of degree rather than kind. Once a legitimate
legislative decision is made to internalize an environmental exter-
nality, two alternatives are present; imposition of a tax calculated
at the cost to the state of the environmental impact, or elimination
of the impact entirely through a prohibition. Either alternative will
force the market price of the product to reflect the former external-
ity of environmental impact, a tax by directly adding the environ-
mental cost to the price, and a prohibition by inducing the expense
of changed production and distribution methods (included in the
final market price) that will avoid the environmental impact. Tech-
nically, the tax can be based on the payment required to force the
"polluters" voluntarily to eliminate the detriment. This method
might be called "removing the economic incentive to pollute." 0 For
practical purposes, however, the cost to the state will be calculated
on the dollar cost of rectifying the environmental damage.
The ultimate issue, therefore, requires defining when a regula-
166. Meyers, supra note 149, at 448-50.
167. Meyers lists perfect competition and correct supply, demand, and price informa-
tion in addition to no externalities as other essential elements to free market economy. The
presence of these prerequisites may be questioned, as can the initial assumption of free
market economies that man will always act to maximize his own welfare. See Meyers, supra
note 149, at 448.
168. Id. at 452.
169. Appropriate cost is defined by the legislature, or perhaps even common consensus.
170. See Meyers, supra note 149, at 449.
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tory prohibition rather than a tax based on state costs is the justifia-
ble method of internalizing the externality of environmental impact
caused by interstate commerce. One such instance arises when the
cost of rectifying the impact may be prohibitive. For example, a
1971 New York State estimate placed the cost of bottle litter clean-
up at 30 cents per bottle."' In such cases a prohibition of the impact
would serve the value expressed in the Pike standard of being the
least restrictive method of internalizing the externality. A ban on
one-way bottles would result in a far smaller price increase than the
thirty cents per bottle tax permissible under present tax analysis.
The beverage would arrive at the market place at a cheaper price
and with less burden on interstate commerce. A second situation in
which a prohibition is justifiable exists when the damage done by
the environmental impact is irreversible. An irreversible impact
cannot be successfully rectified by state measures, no matter what
their costs. An example would be strip mining that is so extensive
that the land could never be successfully reclaimed for its former use
as a human recreation area and habitat for wildlife. Conceptually,
an irreversible impact serves to extend the externalities of a given
environmental impact over time, thus increasing the cost of the
impact. In the strip mining example, the impact is not only on the
existing population, which suffers the loss of recreational use of the
mountains, but on succeeding generations who are foreclosed from
the same recreation by the environmental impact.7 3 These future
externalities of an irreversible environmental impact will be diffi-
cult to quantify, but will increase when extended over time.' A
prohibition in such a situation is the only effective implementation
of the legislative value judgment that the environmental impact is
a detriment. If interstate commerce is incapable of paying its just
share of the state costs of environmental impact, it is reasonable to
prohibit interstate commerce from imposing these costs. Thus a
171. Note, supra note 122, at 145, 147 n.10.
172. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
173. For an explanation of the economic impact of irreversibilities, see Smith, note 157
supra, at 291-93.
174. The argument exists that the replacement of benefit-burden analysis by tax analy-
sis in environmental negative commerce clause cases because of externality theory is equally
applicable to other state legislative areas such as health and safety. A court may thus object
to applying tax analysis to environmental cases for fear that this more deferential review
would be required in all state regulatory cases to achieve a perceived analytical consistency
based on treating all "regulatory" cases alike. As indicated in the text between notes 140 and
141 supra, the difference between a tax and a regulatory prohibition is one of degree, not
quality. Environmental impact, however, can also be distinguished from health (except in
extreme cases) and safety because the former has a far greater irreversible impact and hence
greater externalities for succeeding generations.
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prohibition represents the same legislative intent as a tax-
internalization of a previous external cost into the market price of
an item. Although some commerce clause cases indicate other-
wise, a prohibition of an environmental impact will simply increase
the cost of marketing an item in interstate commerce in the same
way that a tax wouldn'-by justifiably internalizing an externality.
When both environmental taxes and prohibitions are viewed as
an attempt to internalize an externality cost, the tax cases provide
the most appropriate standard of review for constitutionality under
the commerce clause. Identical concerns are protected without en-
gaging in a subjective balancing of benefits and burdens more pro-
perly left to state legislatures.
V. CONcLUSION
The tax standards of Complete Auto Transit and Delta Airlines
can be successfully applied to state regulatory environmental legis-
lation. First, the statute must not discriminate against interstate
commerce. As discussed above, the label "discrimination" is more
of a conclusion than a starting point. At least with respect to articles
that have actual or potential adverse externalities far in excess of
their commercial value, such as the garbage in City of Philadelphia,
states permitting these articles to enter the flow of interstate com-
merce are guilty of as much discrimination and protectionism as
those states erecting barriers against such items. Under current
analysis, however, even one branch of the doctrine of quasi-
sovereignty suggests that legislation must result in equal treatment
of intrastate and interstate activity.
Second, the tax must reflect a "fair, if imperfect, approxima-
tion of the use of facilities for whose benefits they are imposed."",
175. Southern Pacific v. Arizona emphasized the "confusion" that a maximum train
length statute would impose on interstate commerce. Justice Black, author of the Firemen
opinion, however, maintained explicitly in his Southern Pacific dissent that the burden
created was nothing more than an additional cost. 325 U.S. at 793 (Black, J., dissenting).
Several challenges to state environmental legislation not involving extensive commerce clause
analysis have supported the contention that a regulatory prohibition only imposes increased
costs on interstate commerce. Soap & Detergent Ass'n v. Clark, 330 F. Supp. 1218, 1221
(S.D. Fla. 1971) (costs of phosphate removal from sewerage greater than costs of phosphate
ban); Soap & Detergent Ass'n v. Offut, 3 ENvm. REP. CAs. (BNA) 1117 (D. Ind. 1971) (only
impact of phosphate ban on manufacturer was increased cost); Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.
v. Barber, 118 Vt. 206, 105 A.2d 271 (1954) (one-way bottle ban upheld; profit margins not
constitutionally protected). The theory that the taxing standard of "just share of costs" and
the concept of externalities should be considered in determining whether a regulation consti-
tuted an excessive burden on interstate commerce was advanced in Note, State Environmen-
tal Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1762, 1782-83 (1974).
176. Evansville-Vanderburg Airport v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707, 717 (1972). The levy
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Portland Pipe held that the environment, and danger to the envi-
ronment, constituted "state facilities" for purposes of this test. This
analogy is conceptually valid since the environment now requires
maintenance and repair similar to more traditional facilities."' This
portion of the standard protects the same concerns evidenced in
Procter & Gamble that the statutory means effectuate the legisla-
tive purpose.7 8 The statute must reasonably apply to those areas of
commerce causing the unwanted environmental impact.
Third, Complete Auto Transit requires that the tax be related
to services provided by the state,"' reflecting the Delta Airlines
requirement that the fees not be "excessive" in relation to costs
incurred.' As suggested earlier, the standard of state costs could be
dollar costs to the state of rectifying the environmental impact. A
tax grossly in excess of actual or projected state costs would be
invalid as a means of rectifying the environmental impact, as would
prohibitions that could be replaced by a less restrictive tax.'' Irre-
parable environmental'damage or excessive cost in rectifying the
damage would justify a prohibition as the only effective means of
internalizing the externality, and hence the imposing on interstate
commerce of its "just share" of the costs imposed by its presence.
Characterizing environmental impact as a cost is a legislative
value judgment that reflects society's present attitude towards the
environment. Once this judgment is made, the negative commerce
clause tax standards would sufficiently supervise state internaliza-
tion of the external cost of environmental impact in the market
place, whether internalization is through a tax or a prohibition. The
tax standards would also avoid the undesirable judicial impinge-
ment on a legislature's initial value judgment inherent in benefit-
burden analysis. Finally, use of the tax standards would accurately
reflect the present view that the externalities of environmental im-
pact are a cost to the state and that interstate commerce may be
required to pay its fair share.
DOUGLAS KOHLER STEWART
in Complete Auto Transit was a sales tax for general revenue purposes, rather than the use
of specific facilities. For general revenue purposes, the Court approved the standard requiring
a nexus between the taxed activity and the state, and a fair apportionment of the tax to the
intra-state activities. See note 126 supra.
177. A distinction can be drawn in that the environment required no capital expendi-
ture. But the fact that environmental impact has been perceived as a cost gives the environ-
ment the character of a capital asset.
178. See notes 114-16 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 125-26 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text.
181. Delta Airlines placed the burden of proof of excessive fees on the plaintiff. 405 U.S.
at 719.
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